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Abstract 
Human factors are causal or contributory in 80% of Class A mishaps in the Air 
Force. Risk management tools are used throughout the service in every aircraft to help 
mitigate the risk of those human factors occurring. The F-15E Strike Eagle community 
was selected for analysis on the effectiveness of its risk management program but the 
data was comprised on Class A mishaps from Accident Investigation Boards since 2000 
between the F-15 (all models), F-16 (all models), and F-22. Cases were selected if there 
were human factors root causes or contributory. A fault tree analysis coupled with the 
Department of Defense’s Human Factors Analysis and Classification System guidelines 
were used to determine the underlying factors which lead to a degradation in the 
aircrew’s ability to avoid catastrophes resulting in the loss of aircraft or life. These results 
were compared with existing risk management programs in the form of unit worksheet 
assessments. This study found all risk management programs within the F-15E 
community to be effective but inadequate for addressing all the risk factors and a new 
assessment tool was developed to properly manage risk to aircrew. Finally, the F-15E 
training program was found to be contributory to managing risk to aircrew through its 
proficiency and currency annual program and requirements. 
AFIT-ENV-MS-15-J-060 
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This thesis is dedicated to all those affected by the loss of aircrew during training and 
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ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF F-15E RISK MANAGEMENT 
DURING PEACETIME OPERATIONS 
 I.  Introduction 
General Issue 
In April 2000 the Air Force published Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-901 which 
directed all personnel to begin implementing risk management procedures titled 
Operational Risk Management (ORM). Just recently in February 2012, the Air Force 
updated this document to redefine the ORM process, eliminating the term ORM and 
simplifying it to just Risk Management (RM). There are now five steps to the RM 
process: 
1. Identify the Hazards 
2. Assess the Hazards 
3. Develop Controls and Make Decisions 
4. Implement Controls 
5. Supervise and Evaluate 
One of the goals of the directive was an attempt to reduce the number of Class A mishaps 
that resulted in the loss of personnel or significant damage to property. Since its 
inclusion, the Air Force has seen a measurable decline in the number of peacetime 
aviation related mishaps (see Figure 1). Anyone who has ever been connected to losses 
from a training accident understands there is inherent risk flying fighter aircraft. Losing 
an aircraft and the lives of its aircrew are just too high a cost for the Air Force to bear 
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during peacetime operations. Unfortunately, according to the DoD, 80% of flying 
mishaps are caused by human errors, not from technical causes.   
 
Figure 1: Class A Aviation Flight Mishaps FY14 (thru 04 May)1 
In 2002, the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates set a goal for each of the services 
to reduce its number of Class A mishaps by 75%2 over the next six years. In 2006, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld extended this goal to 20123. A “Class A” mishap 
is defined as an accident that results in fatality or total permanent disability, loss of an 
aircraft, or property damage of $2 million or more. FY2010 saw the lowest flying mishap 
number in Air Force history: 14, 5 of which were fighter/attack aircraft. In 2011, that 
target number was 10. There were 15 mishaps that occurred, up from the previous year 
with 10 of those from fighter/attack aircraft.  In 2012, the target number was 8. 
Unfortunately, 20 mishaps occurred across the Air Force. To be fair, the ten year average 
has been decreasing with each passing year but that’s mainly due to the higher number of 
mishaps at that time. Since the goal was first stated the Air Force has only been able to 
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meet it 30% of the time. During FY2013 19 class A mishaps occurred across the Air 
Force. In FY2014 there were only 7 Class A mishaps. 
These annual reports also list the specific types of human errors that were 
responsible for the mishaps. The list includes channelized attention, cognitive task 
oversaturation, checklist error, complacency, overconfidence, task misprioritization, and 
cross-monitoring performance, to name a few.   
Problem Statement 
The fighter community still experiences a significant number of mishaps, mostly 
due to human factors. Nearly all of the causes are preventable. Risk management does not 
eliminate risk but it does manage it. The risk management program needs to be evaluated 
to determine if the current measures are effective against these causes. 
In FY13 (the latest published list), the top causal human factors categories 
resulting in Class A mishaps across all Air Force aircraft were the following: 
- Performance-Based Errors: knowing what to do but performing the actions 
incorrectly 
- Mental Awareness: alertness, active engagement in the situation, non-
complacent 
- Sensory Misperception: creating a false perception due to sensory inputs, 
incorrectly identifying the situation or environment 
- Policy and Process Issues 
- Judgment & Decision Making Errors: correctly identifying the situation or 
environment but performing the incorrect actions in response 
- Teamwork/Crew coordination 
- State of Mind: distraction, fatigue, training level, experience level 
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- Inadequate Supervision 
The risk management program needs to target these contributors, as well as historical 
trends, in order to manage current risks to flying, where possible. 
In the F-15E Strike Eagle community, each flight lead is directed by the Air Force 
Instruction (AFI) 11-202 Volume 3 to perform a risk assessment prior to each training 
mission. In the United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE), the guidance can be found in 
the AFI11-202V3 USAFE supplement, General Flight Rules. The form is USAFE IMT 
32, 20050515 Version 1; however, the other F-15E bases use nearly identical forms for 
their RM assessment, but they are not standardized between the operational/flight training 
units across three bases. At Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho both the F-15E units 
use unit created assessments. At Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina the 
risk management sheets are part of a Flight Crew Information File (FCIF) for the entire 
Wing. An FCIF is a type of directive file that all aircrew are required to read and adhere. 
These checklists are specifically directed at identifying risks from the aircrew. Even 
though this is a requirement for each flight, no consistent changes are implemented based 
on the assessment results. Furthermore, the checklists are vague, do not account for most 
health risks, do not identify specific risky aircrew in the formation, and, worse of all, 
make no recommendations if a “risky” score is calculated. The checklist should include 
strategies to manage risk in problem areas. 
Risk management checklists may not be the only contributor towards improper 
risk management. Each aircrew member is required to log training events after each 
flight. These are tracked to ensure each aircrew member receives their monthly/annual 
training requirements. Some of these include Night Vision Google (NVG) events, low 
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altitude flying, and air to air combat maneuvering. The training events need to not only 
satisfy tactical objectives but also risk concerns, given the causes of most fighter aircraft 
Class A mishaps. In other words, the risks associated with each tactical training event 
need to be managed in some manner by the training program. 
Research Objectives/Questions/Hypotheses 
The goal of this thesis is to answer the following questions: 
- Is the F-15E’s RM program effective at reducing the risk of Class A mishaps 
resulting in the loss of personnel or property during peacetime operations? 
- Are fighter flight training requirements addressing the human factors risks 
aircrew face? 
The hypothesis is that the F-15E RM program is ineffective for isolating 
operational risks because it does not address all the factors that have been known to result 
in Class A mishaps based on the existing worksheets in use within the fighter squadrons. 
Furthermore, the flight requirements do not properly consider the human factors risks in 
its program because it only discusses specific maneuvers and training profiles. 
Research Focus 
This research focused on evaluating the F-15E training requirements in the 
context of risk management. Because the primary threats to aircrew safety are caused by 
human factors I focused on training requirements that manage those risks. This involved 
comparing the Air Force Instruction (AFI) manuals to the human factor causes.  
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the RM checklist in monitoring risks within flying 
formations was evaluated. 
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Assumptions/Limitations 
One of the main limitations of this research is that only training data from the F-
15E community was utilized. Since 2000, of all the other fighter/attack aircraft the F-15E 
has the lowest number of mishaps resulting in the loss of personnel or aircraft. This may 
make it challenging to find a correlation between the data. Additionally, the F-15E is the 
only Air Force platform that has two crew members of all the fighter/attack aircraft. 
Arguably, this may be one of the reasons it has such lower numbers than the other aircraft 
communities. With two aircrew members in the same aircraft there is a redundancy factor 
which increases their safety. However, it is possible to expand the criteria to the F-15 
community at large (F-15C/E) or fighter aircraft in total but special care about the 
differences between aircraft in order to not skew the data and results. Lastly, the analysis 
only used Class A mishap data. Class A data was chosen because it is the most costly of 
the mishaps in terms of loss of aircraft/engines lives. These types of mishaps also require 
a formal investigation into their cause whereas the other classes do not so the data has 
been more carefully developed. The other classes are defined by their dollar amounts 
with class B below $2M and so forth down to class E. 
One of the main assumptions of this thesis is that the results from the evaluation 
of the F-15E community can be applied to all fighter/attack aircraft. In today’s Air Force 
there is a greater emphasis on flying missions integrated with dissimilar aircraft. 
Publications and training manuals have been rewritten to include common brevity terms 
and tactics. Additionally, all aircrew face the same human factor risks while flying, 
independent of the technological capabilities of their specific aircraft. The training 
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requirements will differ between the different aircraft but they will be similar because 
they are all derived from the same source directives. 
In every case, there are external influences that will affect the data. With respect 
to this thesis, these factors are the ones that could affect all military flying and aviation 
training. These factors include government shutdown, budget changes such as 
sequestration, maintenance, weather, and aging equipment. 
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
This section extensively discusses the Department of Defense (DoD) regulations 
establishing the risk management program, roles and responsibilities and helpful 
definitions. Air Force specific guidance relating to risk management is also discussed and 
defined. Lastly, aircrew training requirements and unit training responsibilities are 
outlined in this section. 
DoD Guidance and Air Force Regulations 
In 1998, the DoD issued Instruction Number 6055.1: DoD Safety and 
Occupational Health (SOH) Program to refocus on safety concerns across the military. It 
formally establishes the requirement that each service develop a risk management 
program in conjunction with aviation safety, ground safety, traffic safety, occupational 
safety, and occupational health4.   
Every safety-conscience organization defines risk differently. DoD Instruction 
Number 6055.1 is the basis for all USAF risk associated definitions. The following are 
the list of terms pertinent to this study5: 
Risk Management: the Department of Defense’s principal structured risk 
reduction process to assist leaders in identifying and controlling safety and health hazards 
and making informed decisions. 
Risk Assessment Code (RAC): an expression of the risk associated with a hazard 
that combines the hazard severity and accident probability into a single Arabic numeral. 
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Risk: chance of adverse outcome or bad circumstance; such as illness, injury, or 
loss.  Risk level is expressed in terms or hazard probability and severity. 
Hazard Severity: an assessment of the expected consequence, defined by degree 
of injury or occupational illness that could occur from exposure to a hazard. 
Accident Probability: an assessment of the likelihood that, given exposure to a 
hazard, an accident will result. 
The ultimate goal directed by DoD Instruction Number 6055.1 is to have zero 
safety accidents6. The DoD expects the different services to accomplish this using risk 
management tools7. Some of these risk management tools include assessment worksheets, 
probability/severity/impact matrices, and recurring training requirements. According to 
the document, the heads of each service department are responsible for establishing a risk 
management program that satisfies their unique challenges8. In the USAF, this document 
is the Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 90-8: Environment, Safety & Occupational 
Health Management and Risk Management. 
The AFPD 90-8 formally establishes the Air Force’s Risk Management (RM) 
program providing policy guidance and requirements for all service personnel to utilize. 
It further expounds on the program by listing its principles and processes that facilitate a 
safe, risk conscious environment that accomplishes the mission. The RM principles are as 
follows: 
1. Accept no unnecessary risk: the most logical choices for accomplishing a 
mission are those that meet all mission requirements while exposing personnel 
and resources to the lowest acceptable risk. 
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2. Make risk decisions at the appropriate level: the appropriate level for risk 
decisions is the one that could allocate the resources to reduce the risk or 
eliminate the hazard and implement controls. 
3. Integrate RM operations into operations, activities, and planning at all levels: 
to effectively apply risk management, commanders, leaders and personnel 
must dedicate time and resources to integrate RM principles into planning, 
operational processes and day-to-day activities. 
4. Apply the process cyclically and continuously: RM is a continuous process 
applied across the full spectrum of military training and operations, base 
operations functions, and day-to-day activities/events both on- and off-duty.9 
These four principles are integrated into the five RM process steps: 
1. Identify the hazards. 
2. Assess the hazards. 
3. Develop controls and make decisions. 
4. Implement controls. 
5. Supervise and evaluate.10 
 
 
Figure 2: 5-Step Risk Management process11 
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 AFPD 90-8 also defines some additional terms pertinent to this study of risk 
management. Together with the terms from DoD Instruction Number 6055.1 these 
complete our risk management definitions. 
Hazard – any active or latent condition that can cause mission degradation; 
injury, illness, or death to personnel; or loss or, or damage to, equipment or property. 
Impact – any change to the environment, whether adverse or beneficial, wholly 
or partially resulting from organizational activities. Activities can have tangible impacts 
on the environment either directly or indirectly.12  
By outlining the RM principles and steps the Air Force’s goal is to develop a 
culture of risk aware personnel empowered to manage risk at their appropriate level both 
on- and off-duty. The AFPD 90-8 merely introduces the governing guidance on how to 
accomplish this goal but also includes directions on environmental safety, etc. For more 
detailed explanations on risk management implementation there are two more Air Force 
Instructions (AFIs) that we must review. 
 AFI 90-802: Risk Management focuses solely on how all Air Force organizational 
levels and personnel are supposed to incorporate the programs’ principles. Furthermore, 
the document outlines more detailed explanations on the program, specifically 
introducing RM tenets and goals. 
 The RM tenets are as follows: 
1. Risk is inherent in all missions, operations and activities, both on- and off-
duty. 
2. Risk can be effectively mitigated if understood and appropriate action is 
taken. 
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3. All personnel are responsible for utilizing RM concepts, tools and techniques. 
4. The RM process outlined herein applies to risk-related decisions when such 
decisions are not governed via separately established requirements/guidelines 
(i.e. statutes, regulations, or DoD/AF policy/guidance that address personal 
health and safety or environmental matters and dictate particular decisions or 
outcomes within these requirements/guidelines).13 
The RM goals are as follows: 
1. Enhance mission effectiveness at all levels, while preserving assets and 
safeguarding health and warfare. 
2. Create an Air Force cultural mindset in which every leader, Airman, and 
employee is trained and motivated to manage risk in all on- and off-duty 
activities. 
3. Integrate RM into mission and activity planning processes, ensuring decisions 
are based upon risk assessments of the operation/activity. 
4. Identify opportunities to increase AF warfighting effectiveness in all 
environments, and ensure success at minimal cost of resources. The RM 
Process shall be institutionalized and be an inherent part of all military 
operations to address safety, occupational and environmental health risks.14 
It is important to note that the document also states that RM does not remove risk 
altogether or support a “Zero Defect” mindset.15 The Air Force clearly understands that 
risk is part of every decision and every decision carries with it some level of risk. 
Additionally, it also states commanders are responsible for ensuring all personnel are 
trained to implement RM principles and tools.   
 The Air Force directs all military and civilian personnel to complete RM training 
through the Advanced Distributed Learning Service (ADLS) computer based training 
website. The training module is called the Air Force Risk Management Fundamentals 
Course. Completing the module is a one-time requirement for all personnel and each 
MAJCOM has the authority to require more frequent or additional training. For most 
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MAJCOMs the risk management program is managed through the safety office. In the F-
15E community the requirements are to complete the ADLS module and receive annual 
refresher training once every year through the unit Safety Officer. 
 AFI 90-802: Risk Management covers most of the RM tools described in the 
ADLS module. In addition to restating the goals and principles of RM found in AFPD 
90-8 and DoD Instruction 6055.1 the document introduces two levels of risk 
management: deliberate and real-time. 
 Deliberate RM is an in-depth, pre-planning strategy for managing risk. It involves 
the 5-step RM process steps and is selected for complex, short and long term timelines, 
and high visibility projects or activities. Real-time RM is a limited-time or no-time 
strategy for managing risks. It usually applies to the “execution” phase of tactical 
employment as well as emergency situations or off-duty activities.16 Because of the 
dynamic nature of the execution phase of operations the Air Force has developed a 
mnemonic to assist with Real-time RM: ABCD. 
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Figure 3: ABCD model superimposed on the 5-Step process17 
Assess the Situation: Using one’s available situational awareness an individual must use 
this to identify a perception of what is happening, integration of information and goals, 
and projection into the future 
Balance Control: Consider all available resources/controls to eliminate or mitigate 
potential risks 
Communicate: Establish communication with leadership or within the team to discuss 
options to eliminate or mitigate risk hazards; a loss of situational awareness may be 
identified by an inability to effectively communicate  
Decide & Debrief: Select and implement a near immediate course of action18 
 
The ABCD model is continuously utilized during flying operations. This model is 
implemented routinely during flight given the dynamic environment of F-15E training. 
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Aircrew flight training requirements 
 In USAFE, AFI 11-202 Volume 3 (USAFE Supplement) directs all MDSs to 
conduct a risk assessment when flying in Europe.19 As stated earlier, the F-15E version of 
this form is the USAFE BASE IMT 32, 20050515, but is very similar to other checklists 
in operation. I will assess the effectiveness of this form in the next section and also 
highlight any differences from the other forms from other bases. 
 The Ready Aircrew Program (RAP) tasking memorandum (RTM) outlines the 
requirements each aircrew must accomplish in order to meet combat mission ready 
(CMR) status. CMR status identifies an individual as fit and trained to deploy to perform 
their primary duty Air Force specialty code (DAFSC), or job. The RTM is updated 
annually or as required and aligns with other directives including Component-Numbered 
Air Force (C-NAF) expectations and Designed Operational Capability (DOC) 
statements.20 It becomes filed as an official document at the end of AFI 11-2F-15E 
Volume 1 once it is published and applies to the entire combat Air Force (CAF). The 
RTM defines the minimum number of required annual sorties, simulator missions, and air 
and ground training events for each aircrew. It does not specifically discuss ways to 
reduce risk. It is implied through the RTM that if an aircrew meets all the annual 
requirements for a particular training event then that individual is at an acceptable risk 
level for successfully completing that task, in other words, they are proficient. However, 
the requirements are tabulated annually. They do not assess the individual’s preparation 
on any given day. For example, each CMR F-15E aircrew is required to complete 3 DCA 
(Defensive Counter-Air) night sorties per year. If an individual completes them all in a 
single week in January the individual is considered proficient for the year. Common 
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sense would dictate that if the individual did not fly another sortie of this type until April 
of the same year they may not be as proficient as they were in January. There is another 
parameter that is measured in order to account for this discrepancy: currency. 
 AFI 11-202 Volume 1 defines different requirements to meet qualification levels, 
such as CMR, BMC (Basic Mission Capable), or MQT (Mission qualification training) 
and the different proficiency expectations for each.21 Furthermore, this AFI identifies 
further instruction in another F-15E-specific publication, AFI 11-2F-15E Volume 1. 
 AFI 11-2F-15E Volume 1 thoroughly describes the requirements for maintaining 
and regaining currency for each of the training events outlined in the RTM. Of note, there 
are different currency durations between experienced and inexperienced aircrew—
delineated by the number of flight hours of the individual—and day and night events.22 
It’s implied that remaining current in these events reduces the risk to an acceptable level 
for performing the task without significant incident. 
 It is clear the Air Force takes both risk management and combat capability 
seriously. There are numerous publications and directives that dictate the details 
establishing the guidelines for aircrew qualifications and maintaining them in accordance 
with annual training requirements. Indeed, they are the basis for unit training plans and 
tactical focus. With respect to risk management, the Air Force has also laid the 
groundwork for proper implementation. However, unlike the training program, the risk 
management program expects each MDS to produce its own assessment program as long 
as it incorporates the risk management models. Although USAFE BASE IMT 32, 
20050515 satisfies this basic criterion, it falls short on capturing all the data associated 
with Class A mishap human factors causes. 
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 Outside the DoD in the United States the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
dictates how aviation agencies will conduct risk assessments. The FAA System Safety 
Handbook is the source document for these procedures. The FAA principles of risk 
management closely mirror the DoD and Air Force instructions discussed above with 
slight changes in definitions and management cycles.23 
 
Conclusion 
 This investigation supports the hypothesis that the flight training program does 
not properly address human factors. The RAP Tasking Message combined with the 
requirements in AFI 11-2-F-15E Volume 1regarding proficiency and currency do account 
for risk, though not explicitly. One of the best ways it does this is through the supervision 
requirements for each of the upgrade sorties or currency requalification. 
 According to AFPD 90-8, the first step in the Risk Management process is to 
identify the hazards. Without a thorough completion of this step the following tasks in the 
cycle will also be incomplete. In the next chapter the ro qot causes of class A mishaps 
and their underlying factors are compared to the risk management programs at the unit 
levels, specifically their worksheets, to validate the hypothesis in chapter 1. 
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III. Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter discusses the different tools available to identify the root causes of 
class A mishaps and how to use them. There is a detailed explanation on the Fault Tree 
Analysis tool as the appropriate choice for this investigation. 
Analysis Tools 
This research will assist in determining which underlying reasons affect the 
probability of a debilitating human factor occurrence. There are many different methods 
and tools available to identify faults and root causes within a system. The failure mode 
and effects analysis (FMEA) is an inductive, bottom-up analysis method aimed at 
analyzing the effects of a single component of function failures on equipment or 
subsystems.24 The FMEA is not an appropriate choice for this study because the Class A 
results are already know: loss of life/aircraft. The failure in one of the human factors 
components leads to a Class A mishap (worse case), within the confines of our study. 
Additionally, an FMEA is not able to analyze how multiple failure components (i.e. 
different human factors) affect the outcome.  
A reliability block diagram (RBD) is a diagrammatic method for showing how 
component reliability contributes to the success of failure of a complex system. RBD is 
also known as a dependence diagram (DD).25, 26 When we compare our results between 
different aircraft we could use an RBD to identify redundant systems and their effect on 
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the outcome. The most obvious differences between the four aircraft frames considered 
are the number of engines and the number of aircrew members. Having two engines or 
two aircrew or both decreases the likelihood of an overall system failure due to the 
redundancy components. However, human factors are more complicated for this type of 
analysis. For example, a failure of a pilot due to channelized attention combined with task 
saturation will not always result in a mishap. Numerous internal and external factors can 
affect the outcome of the failure of this type. For instance, an experienced wingman 
(other pilot/aircrew part of the flight formation) may be able refocus the disabled pilot 
through effective communication. Also, on that particular flight the disabled pilot may 
have developed symptoms of illness and is unable to perform at their best for that reason 
potentially resulting in a mishap. When you consider these issues an RBD would be too 
complicated to be useful. 
Root cause analysis (RCA) is a method of problem solving used for identifying 
the root causes of faults or problems.27 RCA is utilized by Accident Investigation Boards 
(AIBs) and Safety Investigation Boards (SIBs) alike. The premise is the analysis 
determines a cause which, if removed, would not result in an undesired effect. The case 
studies applied to this analysis used RCA to determine which human factors were found 
causal in the mishaps. An RCA may be used to discover these factors but a significant 
disadvantage of this approach is its effectiveness. The quality of RCA is dependent on the 
accuracy of the input data. Also, users tend to select and interpret data to support their 
predispositions. Lastly, it lacks a scale to measure the severity and impact of each cause. 
That being said it could be used to analyze my hypothesis as well. 
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A Why-because analysis (WBA) is a method for accident analysis.28 The result 
from a WBA analysis is a why-because graph (WBG) which details the casual factors 
leading to an accident. It is an objective look at identifying root causes of accidents. 
WBA is not an appropriate choice for this analysis because human factors is incredibly 
subjective. The subjective nature of this type of analysis is an important quality for 
further expansion of this research which is discussed later. 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a deductive, top-down method aimed at analyzing 
the effectiveness of initiating faults and events on a complex system. Similarly to the 
RCA, the FTA is also used to identify root causes. This analytical tool is appropriate to 
this study because it permits the investigation to filter down to whichever level one 
selects. It requires a thorough understanding of the system being studied to account for all 
the factors affecting the fault. FTA is best suited for safety engineering and reliability 
engineering to understand how a system can fail or how to reduce the risk of failure. The 
difficulty with an FTA in this case is that human factors are very subjective but 
identifying underlying factors that affect the likelihood of those events occurring will 
overcome this obstacle. This information will be compared to the risk management 
worksheet USAFE BASE IMT 32, 200505015, with highlights from the other 
worksheets, and identified how it can be improved.  
An FTA is illustrated using a diagram with specific symbols, called events, 
transfer lines, and gates, to describe the causal factors for the fault. Table 1 shows the 
symbols and their meanings. Figure 4 illustrates a basic example of its process. 
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Table 1: Fault tree analysis symbols and meanings29 
Symbol Name Meaning 
 
And gate Event above happens only if all events below happen. 
 
Or gate 
Event above happens if 
one or more of events 
below are met. 
 
Inhibit gate 
Event above happens if 
event below happens and 
conditions described in 
oval happen. 
 
Combination 
gate 
Event that results from 
combination of events 
passing through gate 
below it. 
 
Basic event Event that does not have any contributory events. 
 
Undeveloped 
basic event 
Event that does have 
contributory events, but 
which are not shown. 
 
Remote 
basic event 
Event that does have 
contributory events, but 
which are shown in 
another diagram. 
 
Transferred 
event 
A link to another diagram 
or to another part of the 
same diagram. 
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Switch 
Used to include or exclude 
other parts of the diagram 
which may or may not 
apply in specific situations. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Fault tree analysis subjective example30 
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 In the next section the data from the Class A mishaps will be listed along with the 
human factors causes or contributors. The FTA tool shows the underlying causes behind 
these human factors. Using this information the F-15E risk management worksheets are 
compared to each other and then evaluated on their effectiveness to determine whether 
changes need to be implemented.  
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IV. Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
As previously discussed a fault tree analysis was used to determine the causes of 
F-15E Class A mishaps as they relate to human factors. Since human factors have been 
shown to contribute to 80% of Class A mishaps the focus has been tailored to understand 
how to minimize risk of their occurrence or eliminate it altogether. 
 
Case Studies 
After a Class A mishap there are two investigations that are started, a safety 
investigation board (SIB) and an accident investigation board (AIB). The SIB results are 
privileged information released only to aircrew for safety reasons to avoid future 
incidents of the same type. This information is protected from prosecution. The AIB 
results are a legal finding releasable for public record. The two board results almost 
always coincide. For security purposes this investigation only used AIB results.  
According to DoD Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
7.0, all human factors can be classified into two general categories: Mishap-level factors 
and Person-Level factors. This analysis focuses solely on the latter category because the 
mishap-level factors are beyond the control of the aircrew, mostly concerned with 
maintenance and the mechanical workings of the aircraft. Person-Level factors are further 
subcategorized into three lower levels shown in figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5: Person-Level Factors31 
There are 10 categories of contributing factors to mishaps: Physical environment, 
technological environment, teamwork, physical/medical problem, state of mind, sensory 
misperception, mental awareness, performance-based errors, judgment & decision-
making errors, and violations. All these categories have been contributing factors to Class 
A mishaps over the past five years across all Air Force aircraft. The root causes according 
to Accident Investigation Boards have been spatial disorientation, environmental and 
procedural factors32, misperception of the operational conditions, erroneous expectation 
for a night event, inexperience by the crew33, channelized attention, an improper 
crosscheck34, not in compliance with restrictions, and low altitude bird strikes35. 
Unfortunately (and fortunately), there have only been 4 F-15E cases since FY2000 that 
 26 
resulted in Class A mishaps due to human factors. For this reason the data was expanded 
to include all F-15 model Class A mishaps since FY2000 as well. With this expansion the 
count is 15 cases total. All fighter aircraft since FY2000—which encompasses F-15, F-
16, and F-22 data—was included in the data pool in order to gather significant data. 
There are 62 recorded Class A mishaps that fit this criteria since FY2000. The main 
assumption is that despite the different fighter aircraft and training all aircrew are 
affected by the same human factors. For example, task saturation can happen to any 
aircrew regardless of the platform in which he or she flies. The frequency of this human 
factor example occurring can vary between aircraft but that isn’t relevant to this study. 
Furthermore, the data pool was constricted to these aircraft because they are still being 
flown today. Table 2 displays this data for all the cases in which human factors were the 
root cause or found casual to a mishap. Appendix B shows an example of an AIB report 
used to gather the data in the analysis. 
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Table 2: AIB findings for Class A Mishaps since FY200036 
Aircraft	 Date	 Root	Cause	 Causal	Factors	
F‐16C	(2)	 17 Nov 99 Loss of situational awareness, 
cross-check breakdown  
Night, Lights out 
F‐16CJ	 19 Mar 00 Channelized attention Strong winds 
F‐15E	 31 May 00 Experience level  
F‐16C	 16 Jun 00 Checklist compliance, crew 
resource management 
 
F‐15C	 03 Aug 00 Pilot error  
F‐16C	(2)	 08 Aug 00 Channelized attention, loss of 
situational awareness, 
complacency 
 
F‐16C	 28 Aug 00 Pilot error, flight discipline Channelized attention 
F‐16CJ	(2)	 13 Nov 00 Pilot error  
F‐16CG	 16 Nov 00  Loss of situational awareness 
F‐15C	(2)	 26 Mar 01  Low altitude, fog 
F‐16CG	 12 Jun 01 Spatial disorientation Channelized attention, night 
F‐16CJ	 06 Jul 01 G-force induced Loss of 
Consciousness (G-LOC) 
 
F‐16B	 17 Jul 01 Channelized attention Loss of situational awareness 
F‐16C	 10 Jan 02 Pilot error Spatial disorientation 
F‐16CJ	 20 Mar 02 Inadequate cross check Night, weather 
F‐15C	 21 Aug 02 Pilot error  
F‐15C	 03 Sep 02 Pilot error  
F‐16C	 09 Sep 02 Loss of situational awareness, 
task saturation 
Night, low illumination, weather, 
spatial disorientation 
F‐16CG	(2)	 25 Oct 02 Pilot error Loss of situation awareness, task 
misprioritization, channelized 
attention, expectancy 
F‐16C	 13 Nov 02 Loss of situational awareness, 
channelized attention 
Visual illusions 
F‐16CG	(2)	 18 Dec 02 Task misprioritization, 
channelized attention 
Night 
F‐15C	(2)	 17 Mar 03 Pilot error  
F‐16CG	 12 Jun 03 Inadequate cross check Checklist error, task 
misprioritization 
F‐16CG	 09 Sep 03 Loss of situational awareness  
F‐16C	 14 Sep 03 Pilot error  
F‐16B	 25 Sep 03 Loss of situational awareness Channelized attention, lack of 
proficiency/experience, task 
misprioritization, complacency 
F‐16CJ	(2)	 09 Mar 04 Task misprioritization, 
channelized attention 
Fini flight, aircraft configuration 
F‐15E	 06 May 04 Bird strike Low altitude 
F‐16C	(2)	 17 May 04 Loss of situational awareness Task misprioritization 
F‐16C	 19 May 04 G-LOC, spatial disorientation  
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F‐15C	(2)	 04 Oct 04 Task misprioritization, 
channelized attention 
Loss of situational awareness, 
unplanned aircraft congestion 
F‐16D	 18 Mar 05 Checklist error Pilot discipline 
F‐16	 05 Apr 06 G-LOC Extended break from flying, 
fatigue from multiple flights, 
upgrade sortie 
F‐16CJ	 14 Sep 06 Visual illusions, 
misperception, task 
misprioritization, inattention 
 
F‐16CG	 27 Nov 06 Channelized attention Combat 
F‐16D	 12 Mar 07  Low altitude 
F‐15C/F‐16C	 11 Jun 07 Channelized attention Loss of situational awareness 
F‐16CG	 15 Jun 07 Spatial disorientation, 
inadequate cross check 
Night, weather, low altitude 
F‐16CG	 18 Sep 07  Severe weather including 
thunderstorms and icing, spatial 
disorientation, upgrade sortie 
F‐16C	 15 Jan 08 Spatial disorientation Inadequate cross check, night, 
weather 
F‐15C	(2)	 20 Feb 08 Pilot error Surge operations 
F‐16C	 14 Mar 08 G-LOC  
F‐16D	 02 Apr 08 Procedural error Inexperience, proficiency, task 
misprioritization, channelized 
attention, fatigue, task 
oversaturation 
F‐15D	 30 Jul 08  Low altitude 
F‐15C	 13 Nov 08 Pilot error  
F‐22A	 25 Mar 09 Loss of situational awareness  
F‐16CM	 22 Jun 09 Inadequate cross check Inexperience, channelized 
attention, expectancy, night, low 
illumination 
F‐15E	 18 Jul 09  Expectancy, inexperience, 
channelized attention, inadequate 
cross check, night 
F‐16CM	(2)	 15 Oct 09 Procedural error Channelized attention 
F‐22A	 16 Nov 10 Channelized attention Spatial disorientation 
F‐16C	 28 Jun 11 G-LOC Aircraft configuration, upgrade 
sortie 
F‐16CM	 29 Jul 11 Breakdown in visual scan Task misprioritization, channelized 
attention 
F‐15E	 28 Mar 12 Visual illusion Night, inadequate cross check 
F‐22A	 31 May 12 Pilot error Task misprioritization, distraction, 
misperception, decision making 
error 
F‐22A	 15 Nov 12  Weather 
F‐16C	 27 Dec 12 Checklist error, complacency, 
Procedural error 
Lack of discipline, spatial 
disorientation, channelized 
attention, misperception 
 29 
 
F‐16CM	 28 Jan 13 Spatial disorientation Night, weather, breakdown in 
visual scan 
F‐16C	 03 Apr 13 Night, weather  
F‐15C	 28 May 13  Emergency procedure proficiency, 
expectancy 
F‐16D	 26 Jun 13 Decision-making error Bird strike, channelized attention, 
breakdown in visual scan 
F‐16C	(2)	 01 Aug 13 Misperception, channelized 
attention, task 
misprioritization 
Overconfidence, inadequate crew 
rest, fatigue, lack of discipline 
 
Results of Case studies review 
A compiled list of the factors is shown below. These coincide with the DoD 
HFACS 7.0 list of person-level factors.  
- Channelized attention/Inadequate cross-check 
- Loss of situational awareness 
- Task misprioritization/task saturation 
- Pilot error/decision-making errors/breakdown in visual scan/expectancy 
- Night operations/low illumination/lights out 
- Spatial disorientation/visual illusions/misperception 
- Weather/thunderstorms/icing/strong winds 
- Low altitude 
- Flight discipline/lack of discipline/complacency/overconfidence/inattention 
- G-LOC 
- Crew rest/fatigue/surge operations 
- Upgrade sortie 
- Inexperience/break from flying 
- Plan changes 
- Aircraft configuration 
- Fini flight 
- Bird strikes 
- Checklist discipline/crew resource management 
 
Channelized attention and loss of situational awareness are by far the human 
factors most often identified as the root cause or supporting causes of a Class A mishap. 
Aircrew are trained to reduce the likelihood of the effects of these human factors by 
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performing an adequate cross check of aircraft sensors in order to avoid fixation and to 
help build situational awareness. Complacency can lead to a breakdown in visual scan, 
expectancy, decision-making errors including a lack of checklist/flight discipline, and 
pilot execution errors. Complacency can be overcome by mental fortitude to remain 
engaged in aircraft/mission activities, proper training, physical fitness, effective crew 
resource management and proper cross check to increase situational awareness.37 
Task misprioritization is another human factor that has contributed to many Class 
A mishaps. Some of the reasons this may occur are related to the aircrew’s experience 
level, inadequate mission planning, and aircrew lack of proficiency. Task saturation 
causes performance to decrease and errors to increase, made worse with an increase in 
stress. It leads to channelized attention or even complete shutdown of performance in 
extreme cases. It can be overcome with a proper cross check, checklist discipline, and 
effective crew resource management, similar to combating complacency. 
All fighter aircrew are required to attend and graduate from centrifuge training 
prior to attending their formal training course for their particular airframe. At this training 
aircrew are taught how to properly perform an Anti-G force Straining Maneuver 
(AGSM). Additionally, they are instructed on the physiological factors affecting one’s 
ability to perform the maneuver. The factors that degrade G-LOC protection are fatigue, 
muscular endurance, not smoking, and proper hydration/nutrition.38 
Training requirements also introduce increased risk. Low altitude operations are 
potentially dangerous due to the decrease in reaction time available prior to hitting the 
ground. Flying low to the ground also increases the probability of a bird strike. Increases 
in flying operations in the form of surges, multiple flights within the same day, duty day 
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length, experience level, and minimum crew rest. Also, stressors from upgrade flights, 
extended breaks from flying, late planning changes, and overconfidence from fini 
flights—the last flight of an aircrew member prior to permanent change of station or 
separation/retirement—need to be addressed as well. 
The remaining factors are mainly environmental: night operations, low 
illumination (<2.2 millilux), lights out (external aircraft lighting during off for training), 
and weather. Air Force regulations dictate the weather requirements for takeoff, landing, 
and training operations. Each pilot has their own weather category indicating the 
minimum cloud ceiling and visibility for takeoffs and landings. Also, each aircraft has its 
own safety restrictions based on winds and configurations. Environmental factors can 
also increase the probability of spatial disorientation and visual illusions. These can be 
overcome with proper training, focused briefing, and proper cross check. 
When we fit all these factors into the FTA we get an extensive diagram that 
highlights underlying conditions that degrade human components. These include 
stressors, weather at legal minimums or close to it, experience level, mission complexity, 
late changes, sleep issues, ops tempo, and proficiency/currency levels, to name a few. See 
Figure 6 for the complete breakdown. 
 The FTA was developed using the person-level factors as a road map. The first 
step towards constructing the FTA is to begin with the fault, in this case the Class A 
mishap. The next step is to create contributory branches from this fault. Based on the 
person-level factors diagram there are three main branches that contribute to this fault: 
unfavorable environment, inappropriate actions, and degraded physical and mental state 
(individual issues). Teamwork is mentioned as a person-level factor but this is captured 
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elsewhere under one of the other categories. The three branches are related to the three 
phases of the aircrew’s interaction with their environment: perception, decision, and 
execution factors. 
The unfavorable environment encompasses external influences. The external 
influences, although not controlled by aircrew, do affect the potential for a debilitating 
human factor to occur, namely the environment which influences the aircrew’s 
perception. These are weather, light conditions, and the aircraft readiness itself. The 
aircraft readiness is labeled “technical issues” and is beyond the scope of human factors. 
They were ignored for the sake of this analysis which is why they were designated by a 
diamond—event that does have contributory events, but which are not shown. The 
weather hazards to aircrew include thunderstorms, icing, strong winds, temperature, and 
birds (as related to seasonal migrations and historic patterns). When these hazards 
increase in their impact factor or frequency it increases the risk of a Class A mishap 
occurring. They were indicated by circles because they are basic events. Visual illusions 
and bird activity were designated by diamonds because there is more depth to each of 
these categories but not needed for this level of analysis. With respect to the night 
operations the illumination level can play a factor in spatial disorientation. External 
aircraft lighting is controlled by the aircrew. If the training calls for reduced lighting or 
lights out (no external lighting) there are associated risk factors with these conditions. 
These are basic events designated by circles. 
The internal environment is the aircrew’s physical and mental abilities. These can 
affect the decision making ability of the aircrew. When human factors are present they 
can lead to the degradation of the aircrew’s physical and mental state. The physical 
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problems that can be present if aircrew is able to fly, not on DNIF (duty not including 
flying) status, are a G-LOC or physical fatigue. The FTA shows the factors that 
contribute to these two physical conditions as it relates to flying in fighter aircraft. 
Diamonds are used for both poor fitness and nutrition because the depth of these issues is 
not required to illustrate their impact. Excessive stress, circadian rhythm issues, and lack 
of sleep are basic events that contribute to physical fatigue. Illness is a diamond because 
not all illnesses degrade the physical ability for aircrew to perform their flying duties. 
Their inclusion implies that the illness is either being treated by flight doctor safe-for-
flying prescription medications or is not deemed serious enough to completely degrade 
the aircrew’s ability to perform their flying duties. The latter is completely subjective and 
not always correct. Lastly, the high ops tempo is a diamond because there are affected by 
many other influences outside the human factors scope. Some of these high ops tempo 
factors related to fatigue include the length each aircrew is working daily (related to crew 
rest), weekly (related to the fighter scheduling timeline), and monthly (related to required 
aircrew proficiency). 
Distraction causes a degraded mental state for aircrew. The elements of 
distraction include task saturation/channelized attention, complacency, and mental stress. 
These all result in a loss of situational awareness, designated by an oval. The hexagon 
was used to show that distraction would occur if the rest of the branches below it also 
occurred. Mental stress was selected as a basic event for simplification. The existence of 
stress is enough to affect an individual’s risk, regardless of where is stems from. 
Assessing the amount of stress is necessary for managing individual risk. 
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Task saturation and channelized attention are the top two human factors that are 
root causes or contributory to Class A mishaps and their understanding is crucial to 
managing their likelihood. As such, aircrew face four dimensions that contribute to this 
likelihood: lack of experience, poor crew resource management (CRM), upgrade sorties, 
and lack of proficiency. Lack of experience is a compound dimension and thus 
designated with a diamond. The fighter community makes this distinction by the number 
of flight hours attained unique to each airframe. This demarcation is beyond the scope of 
this study but it’s enough to understand there is one stated and restrictions are placed 
upon each category. Similarly, poor CRM, or teamwork, is beyond the scope as well but 
is related to experience level. It is difficult to predict how well a team will work together 
and thus those details are left out of this investigation. The FTA reveals that it plays a 
part and should be considered. Upgrade sorties and lack of proficiency are basic events 
defined by the flight syllabi and AFI11-2F-15E Volume 1, thus represented as circles. 
Complacency is a result of a breakdown in visual scan, lack of discipline, and 
inadequate crosscheck. Both visual scan and crosscheck are basic events. A lack of 
discipline is not as basic and thus represented by a diamond. 
Lastly, the third branch is based on the aircrew’s actions or behaviors, the 
execution portion of interaction with the environment. These are subdivided by 
misperception and insufficient training. Misperception stems from a lack of experience, 
discussed above, and ignored warnings. Ignored warnings are a result of overconfidence, 
a basic event, and a distracted state of mind, discussed in another branch. These both 
contribute to inappropriate checklist use. 
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The other branch of inappropriate action is because of insufficient training. 
Insufficient training, in turn, is a result of lack of knowledge, proficiency, and inadequate 
mission planning, all of which contribute to a loss of situational awareness. Lack of 
knowledge can be caused by many factors not considered for this study so it is designated 
by a diamond. Inadequate mission planning is a result of low altitude operations, 
unfamiliar aircraft configurations, lack of coordination, late changes, and mission 
complexity resulting in task misprioritization. All of these are basic events except for 
mission complexity which is composed of mission events, number of aircraft involved, 
training airspace required, etc. The FTA analysis was able to reveal this deeper level of 
causal factors that must be addressed. 
 
Comparison 
The USAFE BASE IMT 32, 20050515, V1 form assesses flight risk by 12 
categories (see Appendix A-1). They are weather, experience level, mission complexity, 
training level, flight planning/mission preparation, estimated duty day/night (at last 
engine shutdown), pilot/aircrew rest, schedule, lookback/proficiency, schedule 
notification, ops tempo: sorties within the last 7 days, and step timing—the time aircrew 
receive their brief from the operational supervisor about aircraft status, current weather 
conditions, and mission execution notes. 
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Figure 6: Fault tree analysis of Class A mishaps 
 The form used at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base (Appendix A-3/4) takes the 
risk assessment a step further by assessing the factors by each individual aircraft within 
the formation (rather than just the overall flight). Additionally, it expands the weather 
category to include not just takeoff conditions but also training airspace weather 
 37 
conditions, bird conditions, and runway conditions. It also elaborates on the different 
types of training missions including aircraft configurations and assigns point totals based 
on their complexity. The Mountain Home Air Force Base (Appendix A-2) squadrons use 
a form nearly identical to the USAFE one. 
 Comparing these forms to the results of the FTA yields many deficiencies (see 
Table 3). Although appropriate for single seat aircraft it’s important to assess each 
individual’s risk score, rather just combine them into one score. In this way supervisors 
can better determine how to manage risk individuals. Assessing an individual’s personal 
stress level and physical readiness is severely lacking in the existing worksheets. 
Accounting for the effects of the ops tempo is included but not assessed over time 
adequately. The forms definitely address aircrew training proficiency and currency quite 
effectively but add a new category called “schedule notification” which has no bearing on 
risk, unless it’s after the normal mission planning timeline has begun. 
Table 3: Comparison of fighter unit risk management worksheets 
WORKSHEET	 PROS	 CONS	
USAFE	BASE	IMT	32	 Accounts for different weather 
categories, some circadian 
rhythm change mitigation 
Erroneous schedule notification 
field/step timing, does not break 
out for individual aircrew, does 
not account for environment 
factors 
SJ	AFB	OPS/FTU	 Different scores for different 
aircraft within the formation, 
accounts for environment factors, 
breaks out different mission sets 
Does not break out for individual 
aircrew, no stress indicators or fit 
for duty factors, erroneous 
schedule notification, does not 
allow for the effects of mission 
changes 
391ST	OPS	 Attempts to identify risky 
individuals, closely standardized 
to USAFE some circadian rhythm 
change mitigation 
Erroneous schedule notification 
field/step timing, does not 
account for environment factors 
 
 The table was created by comparing the existing forms to the results of the FTA. 
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Proposed solution 
 Figure 7 is a new worksheet that accounts for all these factors and assigns a risk 
score to both each individual aircrew member and the flight as a whole. The form is 
broken up into three categories: human, environmental, and mission factors. The human 
factors have their own individual risk score to identify higher risk individuals. This new 
form incorporates stress levels, circadian rhythm factors, sleep levels, ops tempo, 
proficiency/currency level, and duty day (including non-flying events). In the 
environmental factors section the takeoff weather, landing fuel, bird condition, 
temperature condition (FITS), illumination for night flying, and winds. Furthermore, the 
runway condition and airspace weather is included as well. These are accessed per 
aircraft because the pilot weather category can vary within the same formation; it’s the 
same with the aircraft configuration in the mission factors section. 
 The mission factors section addresses the different types of training missions 
available to the F-15E. It includes inputs for reducing external lighting or external lights 
out during night operations as well. In the planning subcategory the form permits risk 
assessments for late changes to the plan assessed by the operations supervisor described 
in AFI 11-218.  
 Scores are tabulated down the sheet to give the flight an overall risk score. The 
human factors section tabulates individual scores in this way as well but the flight is 
given the highest score in each category for its overall risk score. This score is given a 
rating and may require further approval for the sortie to continue as planned. There are 
ways to reduce risk within the aircrew of a particular aircraft or even changing the 
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mission profile. These mitigations tactics are available to the flight leads and operational 
supervisors based on the assessments within the flight. 
 
Figure 7: F-15E Risk Assessment worksheet 
P~irtent: A.'fecu 
p:11Vprof~ 
2300 - 0429 
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Summary 
The risk management forms from the operational and fundamental training units 
are inadequate to address all the factors from the FTA analysis. A complete overhaul was 
necessary to mitigate these possible factors in flight operations. The key points left out 
concerned an individual’s personal fit to fly readiness. Each aircrew needs to conduct an 
honest assessment of their abilities and manage the risks associated with those 
limitations. There are certainly times when accepting that risk is an acceptable action but 
it must be weighed against other risk factors as well. The question of whether the benefits 
outweigh the risks must always be addressed. 
Investigative Questions Answered 
Across the CAF the F-15E risk management programs are inadequate in 
addressing all the human factors that have led to Class A mishaps across the Air Force 
but they have been effective in managing some risk. This was shown by the hazards 
identified as the root causes of a case studies investigation, performing a fault tree 
analysis to determine their underlying factors, and comparing them to existing risk 
assessment worksheets. The F-15E community has experienced the fewest number of 
Class A mishaps from human factors than the other F-15 models, F-16, and F-22. Some 
of this may be due to its system redundancy or its risk management program or both. 
Although effective it needs to be improved with the intention of proliferating these 
improvements across all fighter aircraft communities. 
Fighter flight training requirements do provide some risk management for these 
human factors albeit indirectly. The requirements achieve this through the requirements 
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for proficiency and maintaining current in certain flight tasks and profiles. If aircrews 
lose their proficiency or currency there are regulations in place to regain it safely with 
proper supervision or additional training. It is assumed that risk is at an acceptable level 
when these conditions are met. 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter Overview 
This section outlines the ramifications of the investigation as well as 
recommendations for implementation and future studies to develop the risk management 
program within F-15E units and beyond. 
Conclusions of Research 
This investigation has revealed that the F-15E community has an inadequate 
deliberate level risk management program. The risk assessment worksheets currently in 
use across the CAF do not properly account for the underlying factors causal or 
contributory in human factors related Class A mishaps since FY2000. The data only 
encompassed fighters still active in the Air Force but since human factors affect all 
aircrew these findings could be extrapolated to other airframes. The focus of the study 
was the F-15E programs but the findings suggest the risk management program 
inadequacies are more widespread. Using the results of the fault tree analysis the 
pertinent factors were identified and included in the construction of a new risk 
management worksheet appropriate for its management. 
The F-15E training program, directed by MAJCOM, includes some risk 
management but its underlying assumptions have not been investigated. This study 
merely revealed the presence of some mitigation. 
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Significance of Research 
This investigation is significant because it reveals shortcomings within the F-15E 
risk management program. With the help of this new worksheet units are better equipped 
to assess their flight risk. Aircrew are still responsible for completing using the real-time 
risk management tool: ABCD to manage their risk in a dynamic environment. The goal is 
always to identify hazards that may result in, at worse, a Class A mishap.  
Constructing a program that identifies the hazards is the first step to an effective 
program. There are still more opportunities to refine the program and make it stronger. 
Recommendations for Action 
Based on this study the new worksheet should be implemented immediately 
within the CAF. Not only would this be an effective way to manage risk but also 
standardize the programs across all units. Additionally, with minor modifications, this 
program can be implemented quickly within the F-15C units. Further study would allow 
it be implemented across all fighter units as well. Since human factors is common to all 
aircrew the differences between the worksheet versions would be restricted to mission 
sets, configurations, and MDS-specific requirements. The intent would be to standardize 
the Air Force risk management program across all fixed-wing aircraft. Rotary wing 
aircraft will have their own unique challenges. However, for all its successes this current 
worksheet based program has its shortcomings and requires further development to 
strengthen its effectiveness. 
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The worksheet will be maintained and updated at the Air Force Safety Center. 
This organization will be responsible for future changes. The Human Factors Division 
already exists under its control so access to more data would be easily accessible. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
The main way in which to develop this study would be to include trend data. Each 
individual aircrew will have their own baseline. Because these baselines will differ a 
program which identifies individual deviations from their baseline may be indicators of 
increased risk or underlying factors not normally found. In this way individual strengths 
and weaknesses can be categorized by mission sets when compared to an averaged 
baseline within the unit or across all active aircrew in the MDS community. 
Finally, closing the loop on the risk management flight assessment would help to 
evaluate the program itself. If aircrew were given the opportunity to assess the actual risk 
the flight experienced it would help to refine the program and the baselines of the 
individuals involved. This is best done through an electronic assessment that records and 
analyzes the data at regular intervals. 
Summary 
By using the fault tree analysis tool to study Class A mishaps for the F-15 (all 
models), F-16, and F-22 since FY2000 (screened for human factors) a comprehensive list 
of root causes and contributory factors was determined and compared against the 
programs designed to combat those risks. In the F-15E community the programs in place 
were proved to be inadequate for managing those risks in accordance with Air Force 
defined risk management tools. The deliberate risk management tool was not adequately 
 45 
followed to identify existing hazards to aircrew and was in dire need of an overhaul. This 
study identified those hazards and proposed a new program to manage those risks. From 
this point the F-15E community can begin to implement the program with the plan to 
reconfigure it to other similar F-15 models and other fighters.   
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Appendix A 
1. USAFE BASE IMT 32, 20050515, V1 
 
DESIGNED ONLY FOR USE AT RAF LAKENHEA TH, ENGLAND 
C. FLIGHT LEAD RISK ASSESSMENT 
ITEM POINTS 
WEATHER 
0 pt . Better than 2D00 '/3nm 
1 pt . Wrthin 500'11 nm of highest weather category in iligh t 
2 pt . Wrthin 300'/.5nm of highest weathtr category in fl ighl 
EXPERJ.EHCE LEVEL 
0 pt . Exper ienced 
1 pt . lnexperience.d 
2 pt • lOT or MOT 
.. SSKlN COIFLEXJTY 
0 pt . Ins trumEnt I AHCI BFM /1v1 lnteroept / 2v2 ACT 
1 pt . ACM / SSA Day I SAT Day I OCF / 2vX OACT 
2 pt . 4vX DACT I BSA Night I SA TN I FCF I Fi'li I l ive I Heavyweights 
_ ....,LEVel. 
0 pt . CT I AU curr~nl and qual ified 
1 pt . Upgrade I Non-curren t I Off Station LAO 
2 pt . X r ide rehack. I Unquatified 
FUGHT Pl.AtHNGir.&SSIOH PREPAM.TlON 
0 pt . DE-tailed 
1 pt . Adequa.te 
2 pt . Minimal 
E$mtATm DUTY DAY !NIGHT (Ar laSt M!J•'ne .sJII.tdoim} 
0 pt . 8 hours I 6 hours 
1 pt . 8 to 10 hours / 6 to 8 hours 
2 pt . 10 to 12 hours I 8 to 10 hours 
RLOTJAI.RCREWREST 
0 pt . > 12 hours since last duty day 
1 pt . 12 hours min imum pi lo t rest 
2 pt . Over last 3 clays: > 36 hours duty or return tr-01'11 CONUS I Any TOY 
SCHEDULE 
0 pt . Days Of nights all week with no swit ching 
1 pt . Switched from one t o the other with at least one day in-between 
2 pt . Switched from night to day with no break in-between 
LOOKB/JCIWROACIEHCY 
0 pt . Meets 1 month lookback requirements 
1 pt . Not 1 month, but meets 3 months lookback requirements 
2 pt . On probation 
SCHEDULE NOnFJCA~ 
0 pt . At least 12 hours prior warning 
1 pt . 4 to 12 hours prior warning 
2 pt . < 4 hours prio r warning 
OP$ TEt.IPO: SORTlE$ v.1THIN THE LAST 7 DAY$ 
2 pt . 1 or less or > than 7 
-STEP TMNG 
0 pt . Step on time 
1 pt . Step late ... (I IC!e: Too-~ rz»ea our oy ops sup ror eacn mgM) 
TOT.aL POINTS 0 
GZJ GREEN (O. o Po.n ts) D YELLOW (7 · 1JPW.!'S) D RED (1 4 . 25 Pofnts) 
FtiGHT LEADAPPR.CN~ lHIT1Al.S TOP3APPRO-VAJ.. lHITIALS SQCCJOO APPROVAL INIT1A1.S 
OSAFE BASE IMT 32, 211050515, VI (REVERSE) FOR O FFI CIA L US E ONLY (W'hen Filled In) 
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2. 391st Fighter Squadron, Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID RM sheet 
 
BFM,1 V 1 NT, 2 V21NT. 
,2V2W)ACT, OCF 
FCF, l'INI, LIVE, HEAV'IWEIGHT, XC 
WHO: 
1 MONTH LOOKBACK 
1 -- MEETS 3 MONTH BUT NOT ONE.MONTH LOOI<BACK • 
2 -- ON PROBATION . . 
3-- oN 
0->12 HOURS WARNING 
1 - 4 TO 12 HOURS WARNING 
lnltfals 
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3. Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, NC Ops RM sheet 
 
 
4 OG OPS (335'"1336'") 
OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT CALCULATOR 
To b~ completed at flight rally. Top·JI DOICC approval must be given BEFORE brief. 
Flight causign. ______ .Fiight Lead. _______ Fit Plan. __ _ 
Note: Points are cumulative. 
#1 #2 #3 #4 
FLIGHT CONDITIONS 
Wx < 1500' /3 Miles (1 pt) I Wx wfln 200' I 0.5 Miles of PWC (2 p ts) 
T-storms in working ar ea (1 pt) 
Wet Runway (1 pt) 
Icing in working area (1 pt) 
Bird Condttion Moderate (1 pt) 
Night (1 pt) 
MISSION PROFILE (0 pts for AHC/Instrument sorties) 
BFM, BSA (assumes low-fly/TF/Range Ops) (1 pt) 
CAS I Maritime Ops I SCA R I CSAR (1 pt) 
AF Form 8 Checkride (1 pt) 
XJC or Off-Station, Unfamiliar Airfield (1 pt) 
Orieotation/Fam Sortie, F~ Doc in je t, FINI Flight (1 pt) 
Mountain Low Level (1 pt) 
Off-Station Coordinationlln tegration (Telecon, VTC) (1 pt) 
OCF (1 p t), FCF (2 pts) 
ACM, OCA-AIIAO, DCA, (2 p ts) 
Heavyweight: Inert (1 pi), Live (2 pts) 
Dry Strafe (1 pt), L ive Strafe (2 pts) 
4vX, CWT, LFE ('<10 Aircraft) (3 p ts) 
Upgrade, Either I Both Aircrew Non-Current in planned events (1 pt) 
Both Aircrew in je t Inexperienced (1 pt) 
MOT Crew Solo (1 p t) 
PIC out of je t > 2 weeks (2 pts) 
Hot Ptt (1 pt), Double Tum (2 p ts), 3 sortie surge (3 pts) 
Lookback : Not 1 month, but meets 3 month (1 pt), not 3 month (2 pts) 
Scheduling Notification: 4-12 hours prior notice (1 pt), <4 hours (2 pts) 
Estimated Duty Day/Night (at last engine shutdown) 
8-10 hrs/6-8 hrs (1 pt); 10-12 hrs/8-10 hrs (2 pts) 
·x· Ride (2 pt), ·xx· Ride (3 pts) 
GRAND TOTAL 
""Grand Totals are per Jet (1.e. each Jet may have drtferent pomt totaL'Resk Assessment)•-
3 approval required for Medium 
~~ 
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4. Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, NC FTU RM sheet 
 
4 OG FTU {333'0/334'•) 
OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT CALCULATOR 
To b~ completed at flight rally. Top·JI DO/CC approval must be approvM BEFORE brief. 
Flight causign. ______ Fiight Lead, _______ Fit Plan __ _ 
Note: Points are cumulaUve. 
#1 #2 #3 #4 
FLIGHT CONDITIONS 
Wx < 1500' /3 Miles (1 pt) I Wx wfln 200' I 0.5 M iles of PWC (2 p ts) 
T-storms in working area (1 pt) 
Wet Runway (1 pt:) 
Icing in working ar ea (1 pt) 
Bird Condttion Moderale (1 pt) 
Night (1 pt) 
MISSION PROFILE (0 pis lor TRIAHC/Inslrument sorties) 
BFM, BSA (assumes LASDTnow-flyfTFIRange Ops) (1 pi ) 
DT/CAS (1 pt) 
AF Form 8 Checkride (1 pt) 
Pilot RCP upgrade (1 pt) 
XJC or Off-Station , Unfamiliar Airfield (1 pt) 
Orieotation/Fam Sortie, Ftt Doc in je t, FIN I Flight (1 pt) 
Mountain Low Level (1 pt) 
011-Stalion Coordinationnntegration (Telecon, VTC) (1 pt) 
OCF (1 p t), FCF (2 pis) 
ACM, ETR, SAT, DCA, (2 pts) 
Heavyweight: Inert (1 pt), Live (2 pts). Strafe: Dry (1 pt), Live (2 pis) 
4vX, LFE (>10 Air.craft) (3 pts) 
HUMAN FACTORS & EXPERIENCE LEVEL 
Upgrade, Either I Both Aircrew Non-Current in planned events (1 pt) 
FTU Crew Solo (2 pts) 
PIC out of je t > 2 weeks (2 pts) 
Hot Ptt (1 pi), Dollble Tum (2 p ts), 3 sortie surge (3 pts) 
Lookback : Not 1 month, but meets 3 month (1 pi ), not 3 month (2 pts) 
Scheduling Notification: 4-12 hours prior notice ~1 pt), <4 hours (2 pts) 
Day-of Schedule Change to put IP in RCP for Wx (2 p ts) 
Estimaled Duty Day/Night (a t last engine shutdown) 
8-10 hrs/6-8 hrs (~ pt); 10-12 hrs/8-10 hrs (2 pts ) 
·x· Ride 12 pt), ·xx· Ride (3 pts) 
GRAND TOTAL 
""Grand Totals are per Jet (1.e. each Jet may have drtferent pomt totaVResk Assessment)•-
3 approval required for Medium 
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Appendix B 
 
All remaining reports can be found on the USAF AIB Reports website: 
http://usaf.aib.law.af.mil/ 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT rNVESTIOATION 
F- ISE. SIN 88-1682 
Seymour Johnson AI'B, NC 
31 May 2000 
On 31 May 00, at 1130 local tim<' (1530 Zulu), an F-15£, SIN 88-1682, was drunagod followirlg an aboned takcoffot Seymour Johnson AFB, NC. The F· ISC, o.ssigned to the 336'' f ighter Squadron, 4"' Fighter Wing, Seymour Johnson AFB, NC WJS pM of a 
surfuce attack training mission. The crew gtound egml5<d the ain:raft otd were oot injured. The aireraft suffered fu-elheat damai:• to the main landing gear and damage to 
the engines due to fire retardanl ingestion. No olber dt:un11ge or injuries occurred. 
There is c;lcur and convincing evidence that the cause of the hot brakes v.11s the mishap pilot's dccision to abort the lllkeoff near IOOition speod, due to his lack of experience. 
During a formation lllkeoff, the mishap pilot determined that the mishap aireraft was not going to rotate and Ul.ke off' when he could no1 match the lead aircraft pitC"h anitudc-. The 
mishap pilot initiated an abort of the takeoiTand 1axied clear of the runway and into the designated hot brake area. Shortly after arriving .at the aircraft. fire-fightilg personnel 
noled smoke and flames from the main landing gear area.. extinguished the lire and directed the mishap crew to shutdo"'n and egteSS the aircran. 
Analysis oftbc 3-ircraf\ discovered no anomalies that would have prevented this aircraft from flying. Due to variatJons in aircraft performance and pilot technique, it is possible 
che lead alrtral\ could ba .. ·c begun to rotate before the wingman's jet was able 10 rotate. 
There is no clear evidence to sbow the wingman's ain:raft had reached oose wheel ~~~off 
speod prior 10 aboltins. 
1'he most significant portion of the cost associated with this mishap was L\C exposure or 
tlte enginos to foam (AFFF) Ore retardllnt. 
Und<r 10 U.S.C. 2254(d), any opinion of the accident invatigatorS as 10m eause of, or 
the factors contributing to, the accident set fonh in the accident investig_ation report may 
not be considered as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising rrom an aircraft 
accident, nor may such infonn3don be considered an admission of liability by the United States or by My person n:fcrrtd to in those conclusions or stt:uements. 
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